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Professor Manne's work is bold; the rules against insider trading
are questioned. Whatever may be the position of the Securities and
Exchange Commission regarding Section 16 (b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 19341 or rule lOb-5 under that act,2 the common
law provided no foundation for any blanket prohibition of insider
trading. Indeed, the author argues-morality aside-neither prece-
dent nor reason support what has become the majority view and
the clear policy of the SEC.
Not without basis Professor Manne reasons that insider trading
has a stabilizing effect on the market.3 In this regard, Dr. Irwin
Friend, who is more than familiar with the economic impact of
securities regulation, said late in 1964:
[A] legitimate criticism of the SEC might be that it has not
devoted sufficient attention to the basic studies which would be
required to determine satisfactorily whether specific types of
speculative activity do or do not tend to stabilize prices by min-
imizing transaction costs to the public and, more important, by
anticipating short-term, intermediate and long-run changes in
f"Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School.
148 Stat. 896, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 7 8 p (b) (1954).
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964).
8 This conclusion is drawn from Professor Manne's demonstration, admittedly in
the abstract, that changes in the price of a share of stock at the market will occur more
rapidly when insider trading is prohibited than when it is permitted. Manne reasons
as follows: An item of inside information has value, and the change in the stable price
of a share of stock due to disclosure of the information may be computed by dividing
the dollar value of the information by the number of shares of stock outstanding;
disclosure of the information will ultimately result in a shift-in the market price of
the stock from the price reflecting its value without the information to the price which
reflects its value in light of the information; if absolutely no trading in the market
is permitted until the information is completely public and completely understood,
the price rise (or fall) will occur in literally no time once trading is resumed; if in-
siders alone must suspend trading until disclosure is complete or until the price change
is complete, those outsiders who have the capability of quickly gathering, evaluating,
and acting upon valuable information will enter the market and cause a rapid
(though not immediate) price change; but if insiders are free to exploit on the market
or otherwise the information they have, the price change will occur more slowly, since
an initially small but increasing number of people wil receive the information and
begin acting upon it over a longer period of time. See MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND
m STOCKMARKET 77-91 (1966).
equilibrium price. For example, studies which I have seen sug-
gest that trading by corporate insiders may be stabilizing, which
from an economic viewpoint would raise questions about Section
16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act. I am aware, of course, that
Section 16 (b) might still be considered justified on equity grounds,
but I would like to see the SEC carry on the types of studies which
would indicate more dearly than we now know the price tag at-
tached to specific pieces of securities regulation.4
Insider trading, so we are told, not only brings stability,, it works
to the benefit of outside shareholders. The long-term investors-
those who hold their stock-will share in the price rise that good
news will bring, and their holdings will be worth a greater amount
in the market. Those who sell their stock will also profit, since it
is a rise above the stable market price which induces them to sell;
they simply will not gain as much as those who hold.5
There is some merit in the logic. The kind of trading with
which Professor Manne is concerned relates to the exploitation of
inside information-that is, "knowledge of specific events or of the
probability of future events that will ultimately cause a change in
share prices."6  Such information has a value which by definition
'Friend, The Economic Impact of Securities Regulation, in DuKF UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW CONFERENCE ON SEcuRITIEs REGuLATIoN 119, 130 (Mundheim ed.
1965). Dr. Friend, Professor of Economics and Finance, Wharton School of Finance
and Commerce, prefaced his remarks by stating: "Thus, a good case might be made in
many situations on grounds of equity for giving public orders priority over those placed
on the trading floor by exchange members, or for limiting corporations, officers,
directors and principal stockholders in their use of insider information for private
gains even if there was a resulting loss in allocational efficiency. However, we would
still want to look at the economic cost of such action and weigh it against the equity
gain." Id. at 129-30.
r This is perhaps an over-simplification of Manne's conclusion, since the outsider
who sells at a price which reflects something less than the full value of the informa-
tion may suffer a constructive, if not actual, loss. Professor Manne recognizes this.
"[T]here is both a plus and a minus for outside sellers from inside trading. The
plus is the higher price received by those who would otherwise have sold at the stable,
lower price, and the minus is the number of sales that now occur but which otherwise
would not have occurred .... Those sellers who lose will tend to be those whose
trades are a function of price, and those who gain will tend to be those whose
trades are a function of time only....
"If we limit our concern to the long-term investor rather than the short-swing
share trader, there is little likelihood for injury from insider trading. The long-term
investor is much less likely than the trader to sell because of price changes effected by
insiders. He is more likely to become a seller because of changed financial circum-
stances or death. A strong argument can be made for limiting our concern to this
group of shareholders, but . . . the effects will be small in any event." MANNE, op.
cit. supra note 3, at 102.
Old. at 54. To Professor Manne this kind of unpredictable information is to be
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will be reflected on the market. Share prices for all stockholders will
rise in direct proportion to the value of the information.7
The lawyer must have difficulty in directing his attention to share
prices generally without at the same time viewing the effect on share-
holders individually. For every share purchased there must be a
share sold. Insiders buy in essence at a discounted price; none but
they know the true worth of the stock. Selling outsiders may profit,
but surely. not as much as will the buying insider. This is a matter
of great moment in measuring fairness but is of slight concern to
the economist, and Professor Manne, it must be emphasized, has
attempted a theoretical economic analysis."
Concluding that insider trading causes no harm, Professor Manne
moves to his central proposition: Insider trading is the only way
properly to compensate the entrepreneur who performs the function
of innovation so necessary to the survival and growth of a free enter-
distinguished from that which is known and perhaps provides the basis for enlightened
action, such as a "knowledge of the manner in which specific events that may occur
in the world affect the stock market." Id. at 49.
7 The author did not forget the possibility of trading in bad news. He concludes
that: (a) for rather obvious reasons the entrepreneur will strive to create good news
rather than bad; (b) bad neivs is less significant as a subject of insider trading, since
it occurs less frequently, develops more slowly and often affects a whole industry
rather than a single corporation; <c) even if the inside information is bad, the entre-
preneur ought to be allowed to trade in it. "There will be no important loss to share-
holders'if insiders do trade on this news, and it will be possible, in an inexpensive way,
to give entrepreneurs within the corporation a greater opportunity for gain. Because
the cost to the corporation for this form of compensation is so low, competition among
corporations for entrepreneurs would quickly force all of them to allow their
insider-entrepreneurs to trade in bad news as well as good. And the corporate form
of business organization, with publicly traded shares, 'would enjoy a competitive
advantage in securing entrepreneurial services over noncorporate forms, where profits
from bad news are impossible." Id. at 155-56.
5The distinction was well defined in a recent review of Professor Manne's work.
Painter, Book Review, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 146, 152-55. (1966). Professor Manne
leaves no doubt concerning his analysis as an economist. At the outset he stated:
"Economists think with a different tradition behind them. Theirs is perhaps the
most scientific of the social sciences. Here the word scientific must connote objectivity
and moral detachment, as well as systematic verification of results. Economists tend
to view any controversy as reflecting a platonic, ideal conflict. The question for an
economist is rarely one of the mutual fairness of a transaction between individual
parties. He is not a specialist in matters of individual morality. Fairness ordinarily
connotes to economists the propriety of allocation of resources or income among large,
distinguishable bodies or groups of individuals. To the economist individuals are
a fungible commodity, each substitutable for another. The economist, viewing the
issue of insider trading, will ask how all shareholders are affected financially by the
practice, whether it results in a desirable allocation of resources, and whether the
return to insiders reflects a competitive or a monopoly gain." MANNE, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 3.
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prise economy.9 Manne supports his position in the following man-
ner:
Insider trading meets all the conditions for appropriately com-
pensating entrepreneurs. It readily allows corporate entrepreneurs
to market their innovations.... [T]his is not a direct marketing
of the idea but rather a "sale" of information about an innovation.
Thus, although we do not allow entrepreneurs a direct proprietary
interest in their ideas, we can allow recovery for their ideas by
permitting them to exploit information about the existence of the
ideas in a market primarily based on information.1 -
Judged solely on economic terms, substantial problems are pre-
sented. Perhaps the most readily apparent difficulty arises from the
fact that innovation, like invention, is usually not of immediate
value. Rather, the technocrats and managers must make those corpo-
rate administrative decisions and take those corporate steps which
will give the innovation value. A drug discovery, by way of ex-
ample, can hardly cause a real stock appreciation until the necessary
long-term clinical testing has been completed, and no corporate ad-
vantage is gained until the discovery can be marketed. To allow
the entrepreneur to exploit information of uncertain value is to
permit a form of stock manipulation."'
Grant that the innovator ought to be compensated. Why should
insider dealing, so fraught with danger-not the least of which is in-
suring that only the innovator will have access to it-be the exclusive
means for compensating the corporate creator? One by one Pro-
fessor Manne views and discards existing forms of compensation, in-
cluding salaries, profit-sharing plans, and stock options. None, he
concludes, save insider trading will permit the innovator full value
for his contribution. His reward is in direct proportion to what
he has given. Who is to know when the innovator will again create?
All other forms of compensation are not geared to the uncertainty
that characterizes the entrepreneur; they are merely forms of in-
vestment. 2
0 "[T]he argument . . . is that a rule allowing insiders to trade freely may be
fundamental to the survival of our corporate system. People pressing for the rule
barring insider trading may inadvertently be tampering with one of the wellsprings
of American prosperity." Id. at 110.
1Od. at 138.
I Cf. Weston, Book Review, 35 Gao. WASH. L. Rav. 140, 144 (1966).
12 MANNE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 134-38.
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The analysis is neat but difficult to accept. Are we to believe that'
the entrepreneur will be motivated to offer the benefit of his genius
only on the basis of inside trading? The emoluments of office of the
corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange s are not to be
taken lightly; nor are they to be viewed purely in terms of dollar
compensation.' 4 Further, can we rule out as inconsequential the
incentive to create merely to improve a corporation? Are we cyn-
cally to dismiss what a former chief executive of Standard Oil of
New Jersey said of personal pride and stewardship?15
We have a stewardship in a company like Jersey Standard and
a personal pride. We would like to leave the company in a sounder
and more assured position than when we took it over. We are not
looking to the company just to support us; we want to make it
healthy for future generations and for the employees who will come
along. We like to feel that it is a good place for people to work.
We have equal responsibilities to other groups: stockholders, cus-
tomers and the public generally, including government. What is
the proper balance for the claims of these different sections? What
part of the profits should go to the stockholders? What part to em-
ployees' wages? What part to the customer in lower prices and
improved quality? Keeping the proper balance in these things is
one of the.most important matters that corporate management has
to consider. We hope that we learn more about them (and each
generation of management that comes in has to learn them); we are
making some progress toward responsible direction.
Thought has gone into Professor Manne's book. It is clear that
he has weighed carefully each of his recommendations. While he
questions the economic harm of insider trading generally, he not
only recognizes but encourages selective regulation. Indeed, he
makes a splendid argument for even tighter controls over govern-
ment officials who could profit, for example, from their inside
knowledge of an agency contract award.' Disagreement with the
Is Professor Manne believes that the value of insider trading will be enhanced
in the smaller corporation as contrasted, perhaps, to the "blue chip" favorite fifty
traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Id. at 156. However, there is no question
that he is dealing in no small measure with those companies registered on the Big Board.
24 There is prestige that comes from office which is more than mere title. Consider
the corporate tax-free foundation which the corporate officer might control and the
moneys that he could direct to charities of his own choosing. See Baum & Stiles, Power
Pools: Private Foundations and Public Corporations, 13 U.C.LA.L. Rav. 938 (1966).
"I Quoted in MAURER, GOAT ENTERPRIsEs--GROwTH AND BEHAvIoR OF THE BIG CoRao-
RATON 75-76 (1955).
28 MANNa, op. cit. supra note 3, at 171-89.
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author, let it be said in conclusion, should not detract from his
basic contribution: His work compels a re-examination of section
16 (b) and rule lOb-5. The result might well be not a loosening
but a more severe system of regulation which will bear express con-
gressional approvalYt
DANIEL JAY BAUM*
27The recent report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on investment
companies is a case in point. Recognizing that it has general power to formulate
insider-trading rules in the investment company industry, the Commission nevertheless
has asked the Congress for specific authorization to do so. Securities and Exchange
Commission, Report on the Public Policy Implications of Investment Company
Growth, H.R. REa. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (1966). For a more detailed dis-
cussion of the agency's findings, see id. at 195-99.
* Professor, School of Law, Indiana University (Indianapolis). B.A. 1956, LLX.
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